Asian Survey

AUGUST 1961 VOLUME I NUMBER 6

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ASIAN SURVEY is published monthly at Berkeley, California, by The Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Correspondence on editorial or other matters may be sent to: ASIAN SURVEY, University of California, 2234 Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley 4, California.

PROGRESS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY

Sydney Crawcour

IT IS THE FASHION in the Japanese academic world and in intellectual circles in general to criticize the government at every opportunity. Despite Japan's unparalleled prosperity and her economy's record-breaking progress, the first release of the governmental Economic Planning Agency's "Economic White Paper" for the fiscal year 1960 has been greeted with abuse for painting too rosy a picture and for failing to bring out fully the dangers of the current economic situation. The government is being criticized for permitting unbridled over-investment, which if allowed to continue unchecked will, according to the academic experts, produce an extremely dangerous situation.

Economics is, of course, famous as the dismal science, but this is surely going too far. The current rapid rate of progress may be attributable only in small part to government action. Considering the comparatively restricted sphere of official economic control in Japan, however, the actions of the government do not seem to have been inappropriate. Certainly the government has not hindered economic progress and, to some extent, has smoothed its path. In any case, problems of structural adjustment are only to be expected in a period of rapid economic modernisation such as Japan is now experiencing.

The Economic White Paper had not been published in full at this writing, but the general survey has appeared and may be summarised as follows.

Japan's economy continued to expand at a very rapid rate in fiscal 1960 (April 1960 to March 1961). Gross national product rose by 14.6% over the previous year, or by 11% if corrected for price changes. Output of mining and manufacturing rose by 23.7%. By comparison, in the United States gross domestic product has been growing at an average annual rate of about 3.5% in recent years.

As can be seen from Table 1, the mainspring of economic expansion was the growth of investment. Total investment amounted to about 30% of gross domestic product. This is a very high proportion, about double that in the United States and considerably higher than that in West Germany. The most spectacular growth was in private investment in plant and equipment, which in 1960 rose by 38% over the previous year. The greatest increases were in heavy industry, investment industries, oil refining, vehicles and the

TABLE 1. TOTAL DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN FISCAL 1960

	In 100 Million Yen	Percentage of Total Demand	Percentage Increase (or Decrease) over 1959
Personal consumption	77,000	47.6	12.6
Private investment in plant and equipment	30,000	18.6	38.4
Private inventory investment	6,000	3.7	(-29.5)
Private housing	3,400	2.1	23.1
Government purchases of goods and services	27,000	16.7	18.3
Exports	18,200	11.3	12.9
Total demand	161,600	100.0	15.2
Gross product	143,500	88.7	14.6
Imports	18,100	11.3	20.5
Total supply	161,600	100.0	15.2

Source: Economic Planning Agency, "Economic White Paper, 1961".

construction industry. Although the bulk of this growth was in large-scale enterprises, it was by no means confined to them. Medium-scale enterprises in the 200-300 employee range invested more than twice as much as they had done in 1959.

The increase in inventories was considerably less than in the previous year. This contraction is attributed partly to fear of foreign competition, partly to an increase in the bank rate in December 1959, and partly to rationalisation of stock control and distribution. The share of government purchases of goods and services in total demand continued to rise in fiscal 1960. While part of the rise was due to emergency relief for disaster-stricken areas and to increased expenditure on education and social insurance, the main factor was increased expenditure on public works and government enterprises such as railways and telephone services.

Notwithstanding the great rise in investment, personal consumption also showed an increase of 12.6%, its biggest annual percentage increase since 1954. Of the increase in national income, 40% went into higher personal consumption. Corrected for price changes, the level of actual consumption rose by 6.3% and the rise was some-

what greater in rural areas than in the cities, where, however, the base was very considerably higher.

Exports fell rather sharply in the second half of the year, coinciding with the rapid rise in internal demand. The fall was accentuated towards the end of calendar 1960 by the economic recession in the United States. Total Japanese exports for the full year nevertheless registered a 14% increase over the previous year. Items showing major gains were metals and metal products, machinery (excluding ships), and textiles. Exports of ships registered a sharp fall.

On the production side, the output of mining and manufacturing exceeded 238% of the 1955 level. The major increase was in capital goods (including automobiles) rather than in consumers' durables, which had been the stars of the previous year. Automobiles (73%), industries associated with the automotive industry, construction, petrochemicals and general engineering showed the greatest gains in

TABLE 2. JAPANESE NATIONAL INCOME BY PRODUCTION SECTORS IN 1960*

Sector	Output (million yen)	Percentage Increase over 1959
Agriculture	12,782	4.4
Forestry	2,172	15.0
Fisheries	2,649	13.7
Mining	1,843	3.6
Construction	6,533	23.5
Manufacturing	32,252	25.4
Transportation, communications and public services	11,557	16.9
Wholesale and retail trade	17,111	15.3
Finance, banking and real estate	8,487	18.6
Service and other	17,357	11.7
Total (gross domestic product)	112,743	16.6
Net income from overseas	- 453	-
National income	112,290	16.6

*Calendar year.

Source: Economic Planning Agency, "National Income Statistics, 1960".

output. In contrast to conditions during the boom of 1956, production proceeded smoothly and suffered few bottlenecks.

By contrast the increase in agricultural production was only 3%, and most of this was accounted for by a record rice crop. Production of fruit, eggs and milk rose, but meat production declined markedly. In general, agriculture failed to respond to changes in demand associated with higher personal incomes, and the government's agricultural support program, which concerns staple food production, is expected to show a deficit of 31,400 million yen, three times the loss in fiscal 1959.

Imports rose by 18% in value over the previous year. The value of imported raw materials was held to a 15% rise, thanks largely to lower import prices. In addition to the heavy investment demand, some liberalisation of consumer-goods imports contributed to the substantial rise, producing a sharp deterioration in Japan's balance of trade after the beginning of 1961.

TABLE 3. BALANCE OF OVERSEAS PAYMENTS IN FISCAL 1960
(in million dollars)

Export receipts	$3,920		
Import payments	3,917		
Balance of trade (visible items)		$ 3	
Net invisibles		-73	
Current balance of payments			$-69
Net inflow of capital			676
Balance of payments			$608

Source: Economic Planning Agency, "Economic White Paper, 1961". Discrepancies are due to rounding.

VIEWED AS A WHOLE, the outstanding feature of the Japanese economy in fiscal 1960 was the maintenance of rapid and sustained economic growth. While the driving force behind this growth was investment in plant and equipment, its continuance was made possible by a higher ceiling of international payments, ample production capacity, a more rational attitude on the part of business, and an apt monetary policy. Not all of these conditions can be relied upon to continue. In particular, the inflow of foreign capital which followed exchange liberalisation and made possible the higher ceiling of international payments must be regarded as a temporary, or

once-and-for-all, phenomenon. An adverse balance of current overseas payments and rising wholesale prices have already appeared as warning signs. Despite this background and some uncertainty in the current outlook, the Economic Planning Agency expects the Japanese economy to continue to develop smoothly during the current fiscal year.

Nevertheless, the Agency notes four major problems which are liable to arise at some time in the future. These concern capital investment, the balance of international payments, labor shortages and price rises.

The high proportion of national income currently being invested and the low proportion being used for consumption, while not necessarily inappropriate in the present period of rapid technical innovation and structural shift towards heavy industry, is certainly unusual to say the least. The present high level of investment is creating further investment demand in the industries which produce plant and equipment. In fiscal 1960 as much as 42% of all private investment went into these industries. The effect of investment in raising output will therefore be delayed. Moreover, because of the adoption of more capital-intensive production methods, rising costs of factory sites and buildings, and the need to expand basic services and develop new industrial areas, the increase in production that can be achieved with a given amount of investment is falling rather sharply. Over-production is therefore not yet a problem. The process of investment creating further demands for investment cannot, however, be expected to continue indefinitely. At the stage where investment begins to slacken and previous investment begins to mature in the form of increased production, some imbalance between production and consumption may well arise unless consumption shifts to a higher level, or government investment is increased on a very large scale, or exports are greatly expanded.

In the balance-of-payments situation the recent heavy inflow of short-term capital must be regarded as fortuitous. The long-range answer to the problem must be sought in more exports and in changes in the degree of dependence on imports. With higher productivity and lower raw material content, Japan's competitive position internationally is improving and her industrial production is moving into fields in which international trade is expanding. Too rapid economic expansion may, however, raise production costs and hamper exports. On the import side, although the Japanese economy's rate of dependence on imports (Value of Imports over Gross National Product) has fallen, this trend has been due largely to such factors as reduced food imports and lower import prices, which cannot be relied upon to continue. Rising demand for imported manufactured goods and for stock feed can be expected. Foreign exchange reserves are, however, at a high level and the problem is not one of immediate urgency, although it will continue to be an important limiting factor affecting Japan's rate of economic growth.

The problem of labor shortage, although aggravated by short-term factors, is likely to persist, and Japan will no longer be able to rely on an abundant supply of cheap labor. Available labor is tending to move into high-productivity industry, and shortages are being experienced most severely by small-scale enterprises.

Increased economic activity and the approach to full employment have wrought changes in the price structure. While wholesale prices remained fairly stable, consumer prices rose by 4% during fiscal 1960. The prices of the products of small-scale industry and of service industries which had been based on cheap labor have risen most sharply. With productivity improving rapidly in large-scale industry it is becoming increasingly difficult for small-scale industry to compete.

Rapid development has brought structural changes in production, labor and the pattern of resource use. In general, industrial production has adapted itself to changes in demand, shifting in general towards heavy industry and chemicals. At the same time growth has been most rapid in industries in which productivity has been rising fastest. Agriculture, on the other hand, has been slow to adapt to changes in eating habits. To some extent government support for staple food prices has contributed to this situation. In the labor field the high level of activity has absorbed a great deal of the concealed unemployment which has hitherto characterised the Japanese economy. Whereas there was once little upward labor mobility from the reserve army of labor in agriculture and small-scale industry to permanent employment in higher-paid large-scale industry, this has now become far more common, at least in the lower age-groups. Over-crowding of facilities in the major cities has produced some decentralisation, but this will need to go a lot further if regional differences in income levels are to be much reduced.

The White Paper's general survey concludes with a recommendation of the "Plan for Doubling the National Income" (approved by the government in December 1960) as a blueprint for balanced economic growth.

THE WHITE PAPER has been widely criticised as being unreasonably optimistic and more like a government economic policy speech than an objective appraisal of the current situation. Some editing, reportedly at the government's request, does seem to have been carried out here and there, but in general this criticism appears to be unwarranted. Certain academics, of the type that seems to specialise in exposing examples of the exploitation of the proletariat, have objected that the Economic Planning Agency's paean of praise in celebration of economic progress neglects certain sections of the population, particularly rural and small-scale industrial workers, whose relative economic position has deteriorated. This latter development is, however, only natural and to some

extent essential to the process of movement to a modern high-productivity economic structure. The point is, nevertheless, a very touchy one in Japan, and the present Prime Minister was once forced to resign as Minister of Finance for expressing these sentiments. The government might well adopt more positive measures to increase labor mobility and to make the transitional period as painless as possible. Much of this criticism, however, seems rather irresponsible, and some Japanese university economists may not be above a certain amount of jealousy of their colleagues in the Economic Planning Agency.

A good deal of the current criticism has apparently arisen from the fact that the White Paper seems rather to have fallen between two stools in the range of view which it has adopted. Basically a survey of a single year, it also takes a longer-range look at trends over the last ten years and at prospects for the future, and the range of view applicable to particular comments is not always clear. The optimistic reassuring tone concerning such things as the level of foreign exchange reserves must be understood to refer to the short run. Questions of structural change appear to be dealt with from a longer-range point of view, and here the White Paper would appear to be over-cautious rather than over-optimistic. Shortages of labor, for example, may make it impossible for some businesses to carry on as they have in the past on the basis of the cheap labor of very low-income groups; but, so long as this development results in the movement of these groups to higher-income employment, it is surely a good thing. Again, a fall-off in investment may be inevitable at some stage, but there seems to be ample room for a large-scale increase in consumption to prevent a serious set-back to economic activity.

To the outside observer at least, Japan appears to be heading rapidly and comparatively smoothly in the direction of a thoroughly "modern" society with a level of prosperity comparable to that of the more advanced countries of the West. This is not to say that in a decade or so Japan will have no economic problems. Problems such as those of small-scale industry and concealed unemployment, which have hitherto been endemic in the Japanese economy, are, however, on the way to solution, and the country's future problems will be those which every modern economy has to face.

Tokyo, July 30, 1961

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THE BASIC DEMOCRACIES SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN

R. L. Mellema

WHEN, IN SEPTEMBER 1959, the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal (then General) Ayub Khan, informed the people in a public address of certain reforms to be introduced into the framework of government, he said that all such changes, whether in the agrarian, educational or economic fields, would be designed solely to provide a basis for a sound political system.

The new polity envisages a stratified system of government, authority being vested in councils at different levels, a graphic representation of which would resemble a pyramid. The system is referred to as one of "Basic Democracies," thus stressing the prime importance of its foundations both in the villages of the countryside and in the mohallas (residential areas like villages but forming part of a municipality). The most striking features of the new system are, first, that it constitutes a brand of democracy that is not arbitrarily imposed on the people from above but is expected to take root and develop upwards; second, that, when electing their representatives, people need not travel long distances to vote for candidates whom they do not know personally; and, third, that the government organs, once established, are required to take an active part in administration and to serve as integral elements of national development projects.

During a visit to West and East Pakistan last winter, I had several opportunities to observe the Basic Democracies in operation. I visited villages at various distances from Lahore, timing my visits so as to be on hand during a council session. I also attended sessions of the Union Councils--of all the new organs the closest to the people because the majority of their members are elected directly by the villagers--in the vicinity of Lyallpur, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, and Hyderabad, and in East Pakistan.

These Union Councils form the base of the new polity. Two-thirds of the membership of each one are chosen by the adult population of a number of villages comprising an electoral district. Thus it is not the village council of long standing that has been made the nucleus of the new administrative system. However, where village councils exist, they can still make a valuable contribution to the work of Village AID, with which they have become affiliated.

Under the new system, five or more villages, with a total population of some 10,000 to 15,000, constitute one constituency, electing one Union Council representative for every 1,000 inhabitants. The candidates thus elected comprise two-thirds of the

Union Council's total membership, the balance being appointed.

An extremely important aspect of the Union Council is its power to elect a chairman from among its own membership. The chairmen play an important part in the new set-up, for they are ex officio members of the councils at the next higher level, the Tahsil Councils, which have powers of supervision over all actions taken by the Union Councils. Some of these ex officio members qualify for nomination to councils at higher levels, so that ultimately chairmen of Union Councils may reach the top of the administrative pyramid by obtaining a seat in the Provincial Council.

Although the arrangement of the Basic Democracies system was a novelty in 1959, it did not represent a complete revolution in polity. In fact, the President simply elaborated a development that had been initiated in 1954, when the government had introduced a program leading to universal "community development" along lines suggested by the United States. The launching of this program had been prepared by a mission of Pakistani agronomists, headed by Mr. M. H. Sufi, then deputy-secretary to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, which toured the United States in 1951 under the "Point Four Program." Their report formed the basis of the "Village AID Program" of 1954 (AID standing for Agricultural and Industrial Development). At the risk of appearing to digress, I wish to suggest the possible contribution of the Village AID Program to the Pakistani countryside.

Pakistan is of course an agricultural country, some 85 per cent of its population depending entirely on the soil for subsistence. There is a pressing demand for arable land, so strong that it long ago led to excessive parceling into small, uneconomic units, the situation being aggravated by the prevailing Muslim laws of inheritance. The average acreage available per family in West Pakistan is a few hectares only; in East Pakistan it is even less. The farmer's fields have historically been too small to repay efforts at modernization; besides, habit was so deeply ingrained as to make him totally unresponsive to the idea of introducing new methods. There have also been large landowners, who formerly took 50 per cent of the annual yield, in return supplying their tenants with seeds or other necessities such as fertilizers or the use of agricultural machinery. Every tenant naturally tried to stretch his share far enough to feed his family and to buy such things as he himself did not grow or make. Under normal conditions this system worked fairly well, but it was disrupted by floods, droughts or other calamities which forced the tenant to contract debts that more often than not he was unable to pay off in his lifetime.

A Punjabi village usually contains between 100 and 150 families; in the North West Frontier Province and in East Pakistan there may be as many as 400 families in one village. Councils of elders have functioned for many years in villages both in West

Pakistan (where they are called panchayats) and in East Pakistan (Union Boards). Their competence embraced the fields of public health, water-supply and road-construction, as well as the settlement of minor disputes. In the long run, however, these councils proved unable to arouse sustained interest, nor have other attempts to reinvigorate the villages been more successful--mainly because the initiative has come from above. Since the councils were not rooted in the people, the rural communities felt no responsibility for their success. The villages cooperated as long as the government insisted, but they remained unconvinced of the necessity for modernization. Accordingly, life in the villages changed little from what it had always been: isolated, unhygienic, and financially precarious.

Within the framework of the first Five Year Plan (1954-59) an all-out effort to improve matters was made through the introduction of Village AID. The principal object was to broaden the perspective of the small farmers as much as possible by instructing them in aspects of agriculture, irrigation, road construction, public health, basic education, cottage industry, cooperatives, and social recreation. The basic assumption of these "community development" projects was that even small farmers who live in isolation and may appear lethargic and totally indifferent feel certain needs which they would like to satisfy. Before the first Five Year Plan was begun, government officials had traditionally told the villagers what needs they were supposed to feel, and those in authority had tried to provide for at least the minimum of these needs, invariably using official channels. Now an entirely new approach was introduced: rural development from below. The Village AID Program was based on the division of the entire country into "Development Areas," each embracing some 150 villages or a population of 150,000. In each area in West Pakistan, 30 village workers were appointed, each of these being responsible for five villages. In East Pakistan, 20 village workers were assigned to one area, each worker taking seven or eight villages; in addition, from five to ten female village workers were appointed for each area. Since a village worker has neither official status nor power, his usefulness depends mainly on his persuasive abilities and on the example he sets for the villagers. Therefore he must be a native of the area and be able to speak the vernacular--as well as having finished secondary school and a special one-year course at one of the Village AID Training Institutes, which turn out 1,400 graduates every twelve months.

The new administrative system known as the Basic Democracies has recently been integrated with the Village AID Program, into the "National Development Organization." This integration is intended to coordinate all development projects, which under previous governments were drafted separately and implemented by various departments acting independently, thus creating duplication and waste. Now the departments' joint efforts in the field of development reach the villages via the development officer (acting as adviser

to the Tahsil Council) and his subordinates, the supervisors of the village workers (who also serve as advisers to the Union Councils).

TO RETURN NOW to the Union Councils, how seriously do the villagers really take them? Having witnessed the enthusiasm with which members attended sessions, usually held in the shade of a tree in some compound, I believe that the various tasks devolving upon these local councils are indeed considered to be the concern of all.

The functions assigned to the Union Councils span a wide range. The Council in one of the villages I visited concerned itself with these tasks: maintenance and repair of public roads and certain public grounds; lighting of public ways, streets and public places; planting and care of trees in general and in public ways, streets and public places in particular; managing and maintenance of village common land, burial grounds, public meeting grounds and other properties; upkeep of accommodations for travelers; promotion of public games and sports; organization of fairs and exhibits; provision of facilities for voluntary registration of sales of cattle and other livestock; supervision of the celebration of public festivals; sponsoring new methods of food production; and so forth.

Another village that I visited showed signs of progress. Here the elected chairman of the Union Council spoke of the artificial-insemination center which the village had established and which was something new under the sun. There had been some opposition, he said, but now that the people were used to it, many villagers brought their buffaloes and cows to the center with a view to breeding improved varieties.

In yet another village I heard the secretary read the minutes of the previous meeting. The first item concerned an auction of bones and dead animals collected in the villages that were represented on the Council. The next item reported a request by the local Christians for assistance in the sum of 550 rupees toward the construction of their church. In connection with the budget for the current year, an estimate of the amount to be spent on repairs to the primary school in one village was presented for the approval of the Council. Then one of the Council members offered several proposals, one of which favored the abandonment of certain customs, particularly that of lavish expenditure on the occasion of weddings. These examples may convey some notion of the interests and proceedings of the Union Councils.

Next above the Union Council is the Tahsil Council, roughly equivalent to a County Council in England. All the elected chairmen of the Union Councils of the Tahsil-area sit on the Tahsil Council; they constitute half of the membership. The other half consists of appointed representatives of the people and of the officials working in the Tahsil. As one observer explained to me: "The object is to make the people and the officers sit together on

a single platform and thus to bridge the gulf separating them that was so conspicuous during the British period."

Occupying the next higher tier is the District Council, presided over by the deputy commissioner, with the deputy director of Village AID and Social Welfare serving as both clerk and adviser. At least half the membership of the District Council is composed of chairmen of Union Councils and of the Town Committees in the District as appointed members, official membership being reserved for the chairmen of all the Tahsil Councils in the District and for various other officers.

Above these councils are the Divisional Councils, of which there are ten in West Pakistan. These, too, have both official and appointed members, the chairmen of the District Councils comprising the former category, while part of the appointed members are selected from among Union Council chairmen.

At the apex of this administrative pyramid is the Provincial Development Advisory Council, whose name aptly describes its functions. The chair is taken by the Provincial Governor, with the Administrator of Village AID and Social Welfare acting as adviser. In addition to the official element, represented by heads of provincial government departments, there are appointed members, some of whom are again recruited from among the chairmen of the Union Councils.

From the foregoing sketch it will be clear that the Union Council figures prominently in this five-tiered system. Therefore, although I attended several sessions of higher-level councils, it was the Union Councils that chiefly engaged my attention. I concluded that, if these Councils are to function smoothly and effectively, higher officials, who must approve the decisions taken by the councillors, have to lend their whole-hearted cooperation. If the officers whom I was privileged to meet and to observe in the discharge of their functions are representative of officialdom as a whole, there is good reason to have great expectations for the present experiment. Moreover, the active participation of the villagers and of the Union Council members, who have become aware that they themselves are in a sense rulers, endowed with the power to further their own social interests and to remedy proved defects, leaves nothing to be desired. They are proud to point out what has already been achieved for the benefit of the local community. Wherever I went, people sang the praises of the present regime. Ayub Khan was referred to as "the great Pathan," and was sometimes likened to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam, founder of Pakistan and father of the country.

Some voices have been raised against the new system, but these opponents are too few to carry much weight. The only substantial criticism that I encountered was in a recent article written by former Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali. He regards the new

system as no more than a device for local self-government, which has existed for several centuries in the form of village councils. He takes the view that the Union Council, the cornerstone of the Basic Democracies, is in form and function almost a replica of the Union Boards, which for forty years have been a regular feature in East Pakistan. While granting that a system of local self-government is useful, he contends that it can never provide an adequate solution for the central government's problem of how to obtain popular representatives capable of assuming responsibility for governing themselves. Mr. Mohammad Ali draws an analogy between the system of Basic Democracies and the problems besetting the central government on the one hand, and the village blacksmith and a steel rolling-mill on the other. What, he asks, has the provision of improved tools for the blacksmith to do with the construction of a modern rolling-mill?

I cannot accept his judgment of the situation as it is now developing. Never before--unless I am greatly mistaken--has anyone in power done so much for the people of Pakistan as Ayub Khan has already achieved in his few years in office--a fact that is not lost on the villagers. At every meeting I attended I found evidence of the Pakistanis' belief in their future.

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PROSPECTS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS IN TAIWAN

Shao-hsing Chen

THE RECENT GROWTH in the population of Taiwan has been startling. According to a Taiwan government report, the population (not including the armed forces) totaled some 10,792,000 at the end of 1960; during 1960 it increased by some 360,000. Assuming an annual increase of 3.5 per cent, the population will double in 20 years. The present density--300 persons per square kilometer--is one of the highest in the world.

Viewed in an absolute sense, these figures may appear trivial, but the trend they reflect is revealing and significant, particularly if it can be shown to apply to the population of the Chinese mainland, which accounts for one-quarter of the world's people. In any case, the rate of growth has been a subject of controversy for several years, and it should be useful to review the main points at issue.

At the time of its establishment in 1954, the Family Planning Association of China aroused little public response in Taiwan despite its insistence that the government should institute a population policy for the island. However, in the same year the Ministry of the Interior reportedly drafted such a policy and referred it to a planning agency for study, thus far without published results.

At a press conference four years later, Minister of Economic Affairs Yang Chi-tseng stated that production in Taiwan was rising, but he nonetheless forecast a lower living standard as a result of a falling rate of capital formation and the consumption by the increasing population of whatever Taiwan was able to produce. Urging the government and the people to reduce consumption and raise production, he went on to advocate birth-control measures in order to relieve the pressure on the economy.

At another press conference in April 1959, Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, Chairman of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, created something of a sensation with several statements bearing on the problem. Pointing out that some 350,000 people, equivalent to the population of Kaohsiung City, were being added to the population of Taiwan each year, he explained that the gigantic Shimen Dam Project, which is to cost US$60,000,000 and require six years for completion, will increase annual food production by 72,000 metric tons--a substantial amount but only sufficient to feed the number of persons who would be added to the population in a 16-month period. In the decade 1947-56, Dr. Chiang noted, the farm population

had increased by about 30 per cent, while the acreage of arable land had increased by only 5 per cent. In 1947 eight persons were supported by one hectare of land; in 1956 the same land had to feed eleven persons. Moreover, population pressure had reduced the percentage of the total population engaged in economic activities from 38 in 1947 to 32 in 1956. Dr. Chiang said that, while the real income of the country had increased 42 per cent in the years 1952-57, per capita income had risen only 20 per cent. At the same time, national consumption had risen 66 per cent. He concluded that excessive fertility was not merely a theoretical problem but a practical one for which a solution had to be found.

In a lecture at the annual meeting of the Agricultural Association of China in December 1960, K. Y. Yin, Chairman of the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Commission, stressed that if the annual rate of population increase could be reduced to 2 per cent, the economy would be viable on the basis of existing agricultural production, and that if it could be lowered to 1.5 per cent, the economy could become independent of foreign aid and might even produce a surplus for export to underdeveloped countries. Economic stabilization, he said, required increased production and planned parenthood.

The views of these three prominent officials concerned with economic development elicited a lively reaction not only in the Taiwan press but also in the Provincial Assembly. At an Assembly session in August 1958, a woman member proposed that the government should establish a comprehensive birth-control policy. The substance of her proposal was approved by the Assembly, whereupon the government requested the Ministry of the Interior to initiate a moderate birth-control program. In November the Ministry, by way of reply, acknowledged the importance of the population problem but stated that an official population policy should be based on scientific research. It signified its intention of establishing such a policy once the data of the 1956 Census had been processed, and promised to bear in mind the recommendations of the Assembly.

At a session of the Assembly in April 1959, several days after Dr. Chiang's press conference already alluded to, the Governor of Taiwan, Chow Chih-jou, called attention to the steady population growth and to its economic impact. The population problem, in fact, constituted the main topic of the session. Several Assembly members requested the government to take immediate measures to promote industrialization and to establish pilot birth-control clinics.

ALTHOUGH THUS FAR the population problem had been the concern mainly of high officials and politicians, these discussions were serving to stimulate public interest. Thus, in February 1959 reporters from the Central News Agency interviewed numerous men and women to ascertain their views on birth control. The responses indicated that most intellectuals of both sexes approved birth control in

principle. Less educated persons were not so favorably inclined, some of them because they regarded birth control as inconsistent with Chinese tradition. At the same time, reports on Taiwan's population and articles on the demography of other countries became common fare in the daily newspapers.

The Taipei Junior Chamber of Commerce offered a prize for the best essay on the subject "How to promote family planning and reduce the population pressure in Taiwan"; the prize-winning essay was published in the Hsin Sheng Pao (May 18, 1959). In the same month the Family Planning Association and two newspapers, the Chinese vernacular daily Cheng Hsin Hsing Wen and the English language daily China News, co-sponsored a conference on birth control that was attended by lawyers, doctors, social scientists, representatives of the Food Bureau and of the Department of Public Health, and a Catholic priest. In January 1961 the China News, which has strongly advocated planned parenthood, published a series of nine articles on the subject of over-population. In recent months discussions of population questions and energetic activities on the part of the Family Planning Association have become increasingly widespread.

As one might expect, not everyone favors birth control. For example, a number of magazine articles written by members of the opposing camp were assembled in a pamphlet A Critique of the Population Problem that was published in October 1960 under the auspices of the Institute for the Study of the Three People's Principles. Its main points were these: (1) Advocates of birth control base their arguments on Malthusian theories that have been disproved. (2) Malthusian and Neo-Malthusian attitudes are negative: the fundamental solution of the problem of "over-population" lies not in birth control but in increased production. (3) Malthusian doctrines flout traditional Chinese values. (4) Far from advocating birth control, Dr. Sun Yat-sen urged his countrymen to increase their numbers. Therefore, birth control runs counter to the Three People's Principles and accordingly undermines the Chinese Constitution, which is based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Principles. (5) The population problem should not be discussed from the standpoint either of one province, Taiwan, or of the world, because the former is too narrow and the latter too wide. It should be considered from the national point of view. (6) After the counterattack upon the Chinese mainland and the recovery of one or more coastal provinces, the government will need millions of Taiwan-trained persons to administer these provinces. Thus the problem for Taiwan is not over-population but, on the contrary, under-population.

Between political arguments on the one hand and social and economic requirements on the other, it has not been easy for the government to adopt a firm population policy. At present, in fact, there is no official population policy. The government's attitude, however, is reflected in official comments. For example, at a session of the Assembly in July 1959, Governor Chow Chih-jou remarked

that the government would not advocate birth control or adopt positive measures to promote it. The government, he said, intended to follow "the perfect way of the ancient kings," that is, to let the people learn for themselves the advantages and disadvantages of a high birth rate and of birth control, and to let them make their own decisions freely (Hsin Sheng Pao, July 3, 1959). More recently Lien Chen-tung, Minister of the Interior, declared: "Birth control is a voluntary act of the people, and no interference should be imposed. The government has not advocated it directly or indirectly. However, if it becomes necessary in the future, the government should publicize the importance of planned parenthood and should instruct the public health agencies to inform the people of the methods involved. Of course, this should be done with the free choice of the people and at their request" (China News, January 27, 1961).

Notwithstanding the controversy about the merits of birth control and the hesitancy of the government, growing social needs have stimulated the activity of the Family Planning Association of China, which has expanded steadily since its establishment seven years ago. Under the energetic leadership of Mrs. Tze-kuan Shu Kan, its executive secretary, the Association now employs 23 staff members and 643 volunteer workers. It has the cooperation of several newspapers and broadcasting stations as well as of 254 clinics and hospitals. In addition to holding conferences for wives and even for husbands, it offers lectures and training courses for local leaders, distributes free contraceptives, and provides certain child and maternal welfare services. The Association not only helps couples with children to plan the birth of additional ones but also helps barren couples to have children. Three large government companies--the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, China Petroleum Corporation, and Taiwan Power Company--have been receiving technical advice on household hygiene and planned parenthood from the Association during the past two years. This year the Association has been working with leaders of the Provincial Farmer's Association and of the Provincial Fishermen's Association. It is fair to say, therefore, that the principle of family planning in Taiwan has passed the stage of polemic and has gained some measure of popular acceptance. Uncertain though the long-term consequences of this development may be, other countries that are confronted by the specter of over-population will doubtless wish to study the experiment in demographic control now gathering momentum in Taiwan.

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NASUTION, SUKARNO AND THE WEST NEW GUINEA DISPUTE

Justus M. van der Kroef

THE ANALYSIS of the January 1961 visit to Moscow of Indonesia's Defense Minister A. H. Nasution by Professor Pauker which recently appeared in this journal[1] needs to be supplemented and, in some respects, I believe, corrected. Though discussion of the matter must remain largely speculative, it would appear that Nasution's mission should be viewed in the light of two interrelated factors: Indonesia's new policy of "confrontation" in the dispute over West New Guinea, and the dynamics of Nasution's position in Indonesian domestic politics.

In July 1959 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that Indonesia would not again turn to the United Nations for support in its claim to West New Guinea, but would instead undertake a "contest of power" with the Netherlands, "as was the case during the struggle between 1945 and 1950." The Dutch would be presented with a "confrontation" in all fields, as evidence of Indonesia's growing strength.[2]

It is clear that this "confrontation" policy, as it has come to be known, has meant adoption of an increasingly threatening attitude toward the Dutch. Before the end of 1959, Dutch capital remaining in Indonesia was threatened with nationalization, and new controls over enterprises possessing Dutch capital had been imposed. In September a new "West Irian [New Guinea] Committee" was formed by the government to effect the "recovery" of the territory. In February 1960 General Nasution declared that Indonesia should be prepared for "territorial war" to gain West New Guinea, and in August he stated that "the West Irian claim should be settled in West Irian itself." Although Nasution's warlike words may not have completely reflected his attitude, he undoubtedly participated in the developing momentum of the "confrontation."

On August 17, 1960, Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with the Dutch. In January 1961 the commander in East Indonesia stated that the Indonesian army "is only waiting for the order to liberate Irian," and in February Dutch newspapers published reports to the effect that an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea might be expected by June. As evidence of mounting Indonesian diplomatic pressure, there was the report of the Indonesian military attaché in Bonn, who declared that it had become his government's policy to furnish foreign governments regularly with reports of the "tense" situation involving West New Guinea.[3]

The "confrontation" has also included a press campaign alleging

the existence of conditions in West New Guinea verging on civil war. Indonesian reports have claimed that Papuans are being "mercilessly persecuted" and "massacred," that "tremendous casualties" have resulted from Papuan riots, and that "thousands of Papuans" have been fleeing to Indonesia. While stating that there have been scattered instances of pro-Indonesian subversive activities, Dutch officials have termed these Indonesian reports gross misrepresentations. Neither the independent West New Guinea press, often very critical of Dutch policy, nor foreign journalists who, alerted by the Indonesian reports, visited the area have found substantiation for the Indonesian allegations. In March of this year three recently formed Papuan political parties protested to Dag Hammerskjold concerning the "provocative and lying propaganda of Indonesia."[4]

Nasution himself has said that his Moscow journey was part of the "confrontation" policy. When he left for Moscow, he stated that the arms purchase "was not detached from the confrontation in all fields in the struggle for recovering West Irian," and he went on to outline other aspects of the "confrontation." Although the purchase of Soviet arms was the largest thus far made by Indonesia, Djakarta had earlier obtained supplies and military-training services from many communist as well as non-communist countries. In connection with a journey which has been interpreted by Dr. Pauker as suggesting Soviet preparation for a major political coup in Indonesia by winning over the Indonesian military, it is noteworthy that Indonesian Air Force Chief Suryadarma, who accompanied Nasution to Moscow, declared at the time of his departure that he would probably also visit other European countries, the United States, and Japan in order to procure arms.[5]

Nasution's Moscow journey had primarily political value, as a means of bringing pressure on the United States to abandon its nonpartisan attitude in the West New Guinea dispute. Subandrio hinted as much when he complained that "the U. S. cannot detach itself from its duties toward its NATO partners in facing the problems of colonialism." Since the communist bloc has consistently supported the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea, Djakarta has ample reason to play the well-known "neutralist" game and to flirt with the Soviet Union in hopes of gaining more favors from the United States. On its part, in declining to attend the inauguration of the West New Guinea Council in Hollandia in April, the United States appeared to be responding to the Indonesian strategy.

Pauker writes that "it seems that for General Nasution alea jacta est," but just exactly what die has now been cast? If it is argued that Nasution's Moscow journey indicates that he is now prepared to attack West New Guinea, one must point out not only that as early as February 1960 he regarded "territorial war" as a possibility, but that even now he does not regard this possibility as a certainty. On February 18, 1961, in Djakarta and on April 28 in Manila, he declared that Indonesia had no intention of attacking

West New Guinea.

As for the Dutch, they have no fears of an Indonesian attack. The Chairman of the chiefs of staff in January 1961 and the Premier and Foreign Minister in February declared that no Indonesian attack was to be expected, that the Indonesian threats were "mere words," and that there was no reason to alert the U.N. Security Council, because, as the Premier put it, the Moscow arms purchase and "the publicity campaign with which this agreement has been surrounded" were designed primarily to create an impression of Indonesian bellicosity.[6]

THE EVIDENCE OF a rapprochement between Nasution on the one hand and the Indonesian communists and/or Moscow on the other is unconvincing. Nasution has his difficulties with the Sukarno-dominated government, but he himself some time ago outlined the necessity for creating a psychological "momentum,"[7] with which the "confrontation" policy is wholly in line. This "momentum" is derived from building national strength (e.g., eliminating the rebel movements in Indonesia, improving the economy, bringing about unity among the political parties). Yet Nasution is but one center of power, and Sukarno has not been averse from playing him off against other leading army officers. His position depends on a certain degree of cooperation with other power centers, e.g., Sukarno and the communists. At the same time, Nasution is far more moderate in his approach to the West New Guinea problem than are others in the Sukarno clique, as was evidenced by his unsuccessful attempt to have Malayan premier Tungku Abdul Rahman mediate the West New Guinea dispute late last year. Moreover, as late as May 1961 he was reported to have approached representatives of Dutch business interests in the hope of inducing them to talk with Sukarno during the latter's recent world tour.

Nasution's position can be gleaned also from his own and the army's relationship with the communists. Discussing the replacement of the army-sponsored National Front for the Liberation of West Irian by the new National Front, Dr. Pauker notes that both Nasution and Aidit, the Communist Party chairman, are members of the National Front's executive board, and infers that, "instead of opposing the Communist Party, the Army is now politically associated with it." This interpretation is misleading, because the army had previously been "politically associated" with the communists (e.g., in the new "mutual cooperation" parliament, the Supreme Advisory Council and the National Planning Council, as well as in local government). Furthermore, Nasution was named to the National Front's executive board along with the leaders of all three principal Indonesian political parties, so that his nomination is hardly significant, especially in the light of the continued curtailing of communist press and political activity by army commanders in several provinces. Finally, it is clear that the army will retain its power in the new National Front over the various cooperative

bodies established originally to counteract communist influence. The announcement dissolving the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian specifically provided that the various cooperative bodies were to be "properly affiliated" with the army.[8] The army intends to keep its hold on various social groupings in the country, regardless of the National Front or of Nasution's visit to Moscow.

Precisely because of a realization of the army's strength, communist criticism of the army has been restrained, nowhere more than in the famous "evaluation" of the present government by the Politburo on July 8, 1960. According to Dr. Pauker, the communists in this evaluation in effect branded the Indonesian officers as "enemies of the people,"[9] but this view is open to question. For one thing, not only the military but also civil administrators of economic enterprises taken over from the Dutch were criticized in this evaluation, especially in the context of the Party's much earlier criticism of the emergence of "national capitalists" in the state bureaucracy. For another, both the content and the tone of the July "evaluation" were "old hat": the Party had been saying the same thing since 1958, and on February 10, 1960, the Politburo said precisely what it was to repeat in July.[10] What the army objected to in the July "evaluation" was communist criticism, not just of economic, but especially of security policy, particularly in regard to the lack of freedom of political expression and the policy of granting amnesty to the rebels. Communist criticism on these points had been heard long before. However, by July 1960 Nasution and the army felt strong enough to counter it unequivocally--additional evidence that the army under Nasution means to hold its own and that a rapprochement with the communists or with Moscow is hardly likely.

Meanwhile the war of nerves continues. Indonesian government reports speak of a "liberation" movement in West New Guinea and of Indonesian "freedom fighters" controlling some areas there. The West New Guinea press has termed these reports "laughable," and indeed evidence to substantiate the Indonesian claims is lacking. The handful of captured Indonesian infiltrationists who went on trial earlier this year in Hollandia in open court appeared, from available press reports, to be dispirited dupes. On April 25, 1961, the newly elected West New Guinea Council passed a resolution unanimously demanding that Holland "continue its task" in that territory "regardless of political pressure" until the Council should decide otherwise. Neither Sukarno's talks with Kennedy nor Nasution's later discussions with Australian and Philippine leaders has uncovered significant new support for the Indonesian position. On the other hand, the current Dutch policy of seeking approval in the United Nations for the completion of the self-imposed mandate in West New Guinea is beginning to undercut Indonesia's "confrontation" campaign.

NOTES

1. Guy J. Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow," Asian Survey, March 1961, pp. 13-22.

2. Antara Daily News Bulletin (New York), August 4, 1959. Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), August 10, 1959.

3. For published reports of these developments see Antara Daily News Bulletin, Indonesian Observer, and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (The Hague), Persdocumentatie betreffende Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea, for this period.

4. Ibid. See especially Persdocumentatie, March 20, 1961.

5. Indonesian Observer, December 30, 1960.

6. Nieuw Guinea Koerier (Hollandia), January 30, 1961; Persdocumentatie, January 28, February 21 and 24, 1961.

7. D. Sumitro, Searchlight on Indonesia, New Haven, 1959, p. 43.

8. Antara Daily News Bulletin, January 25, 1961.

9. Guy J. Pauker, "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia," Asian Survey, May 1961, p. 26.

10. D. N. Aidit, Pilihan Tulisan, Djakarta, 1960, Vol. 2, pp. 554-55; Review of Indonesia, December 1958 and March and May 1960.

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SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE PLACE-NAMES

William K. Carr

MANY WESTERN-LANGUAGE gazetteers and lists of Chinese place-names in current use contain a high frequency of ambiguities, inconsistent alphabetizations, multiple entries for the same place, and even non-Chinese names. The variety of name lists published in connection with area research projects reveals an apparent reluctance to recognize any single toponymic authority. General unawareness of certain characteristics of native Chinese place-names and of the problems involved in transliterating these names is probably responsible for this indifference toward the use of a standard system.

The present unsatisfactory state of affairs is being perpetuated both by sinologists and by discipline specialists alike, and responsibility for its correction does not lie entirely with the geographer. Certain standards already exist, but are generally ignored, even by those individuals who know Chinese. The amount of time consumed in verifying place-names and the practice of maintaining double lists of synonyms can be greatly lessened by an acknowledgment of the native demographic, linguistic and cartographic situation, and by closer attention to authoritative transliteration systems.

One cause of confusion in Chinese place-name identification is the multitude of different regional pronunciations for the same written character. Because China's vast geographical area is almost entirely inhabited, the number of place-names is accordingly large, and quite naturally there are many instances of several places having the same character name.

The majority of Chinese place-names are polysyllabic, and in those instances in which the name has essentially only one syllable, a suffix usually is added so that the sound pattern is maintained. Certain suffixes may also be added to polysyllabic names for the purpose of designating some political attribute. The two in most common use are transliterated hsien and shih. Fu, ting, and chou, although obsolete, are still to be found on many maps, and in Western-compiled gazetteers. These suffixes, both current and obsolete, may not properly be considered elements of a place-name and cannot be used to distinguish one place from another; they merely indicate that their prefixes are place-names with certain attributes.

Because any transliterated name may represent several Chinese characters, the sounds "Chien-shih," for example, may refer to a

place "Chien" with the sound "shih" (meaning "city") added for the purpose of political classification, or "Chien-shih" may in fact be a bisyllabic name, both elements of which are essential. Only reference to the Chinese characters can reveal which is correct.

Physical features may, in many cases, be distinguished from inhabited locations by descriptive suffixes. The most commonly used ones are shan, kuan or ling, hai, hu, chiang or ho, wan and tao, meaning respectively mountain, pass, sea, lake, river, bay, and island. However, the use of these endings is neither consistent, nor exclusive. There are physical features whose names contain no adjectival suffixes, and there are names of inhabited places which do contain such suffixes having no geographical significance.

Historically, the political status of a city or town in China has frequently been reflected in its name; if and when its status changed, so then did its name. Consequently, a map of China cannot be consulted profitably without knowledge of its date and the political status of the locations in question. This observation applies equally to maps made under the People's Republic.

A corollary of the relationship between status and name is the frequent usage of one name by the residents, and of another as the "official" name. Both may appear on maps and in gazetteers.

Furthermore, a location may be the center for several political administrative levels. Such a location, serving as a special district seat and hsien seat, for example, sometimes will be so designated by alternate names or by various suffixes appropriate to the status in question. There is, in Kuang-tung province, a city called both Shao-kuan-shih and Ch'u-chiang: the former for district reference, the latter for hsien consideration.

Another example is offered on Chinese maps of Shan-tung. Characters for both the names Chi-ning and Chi-ning-shih, referring to the same place, are to be found. This device is employed to indicate the several political and demographic attributes of the city. The location has but one name, however, viz., Chi-ning. A gazetteer listing only place-names, and not including any data about the locations, would have an entry "Chi-ning," and no entry "Chi-ning-shih."

The political and economic programs of the Communist government have added new factors for consideration in the place-name identification of Chinese towns and cities. These changes by the government are not inconsistent with the general nature of Chinese nomenclature, but only increase the complexity of all the variables discussed above.

The Communists have changed the boundaries of many of the provinces, hsien, and urban areas. Some hsien have been reassigned

to different provinces, and some of these have subsequently been transferred back to their original provinces. Certain administrative units, such as hsien, have been put under the jurisdiction of large municipalities. In some cases, the place-names have been retained on Communist maps, but the incorporated places may be reported collectively in population censuses and administered separately politically. New urban centers have been developed at localities with previously small populations, and these new centers have usually been re-named, sometimes with names previously used elsewhere but now transferred to the new location in order to perpetuate a historical symbol.

There is, to date, no available gazetteer of any type published by the Communist government. Maps and gazetteers published by the Nationalist government do not, of course, indicate any changes instituted by the People's Republic, and therefore have no meaning in relation to the mainland today.

FOREIGN CONTACT with China has had at least two common effects on Western versions of Chinese place-names. One practice has been blithely to re-name a place, as in the case of Kuang-chou-wan, Kuang-tung. Under the French, the locality was known also as Fort Bayard, and the two names still appear interchangeably. The other practice was to Westernize the original Chinese name, as Kuang-tung to Canton, which, incidentally, is a misapplication of the provincial name. The Chinese call the city Kuang-chou. Such practices result in the concurrent use of several names for the same location.

All the transliteration methods in use reflect, to some extent, the demographic and linguistic character of China, but no method does so systematically.

If place-names are romanized in accordance with the Wade-Giles system, which is the usual practice for English speakers, the various dialect pronunciations are ignored, leading to sameness and thus to ambiguity. If the phonetic equivalent of place-name characters remains in the local dialect, the possibility of confusion with other locations is less than if the phonetic equivalents are transcribed into a "standard" dialect. In either case, there is need for secondary information.

If a transliteration system that does recognize local pronunciations is employed, the dialect used must be identified because identification of dialect, and thereby of geographical region, cannot be made in terms of the written character alone. With a standardizing system like the Wade-Giles, equating sound and character is relatively easy. There is, however, no method by which any isolated place-name may be reliably identified, regardless of the transliteration system, if it is not accompanied by the characters.

The problem of relating sound and character results principally from the use of a limited number of sounds to represent an infinite number of written characters. Another difficulty is that the phonetic representation of a character is not always recognizable by inspection, a fact that is further complicated by the use of the same characters for each dialect, the phonetic patterns of which are not mutually exclusive. So, once again, reliable identification of a Chinese place-name, whether transliterated or in native script, requires secondary information--geographic coordinates, the location's political-administrative status, demographic or economic data, or the like.

Despite the tendency to ignore dialects when rendering romanizations, enough examples of dialect spellings are in actual use to cause confusion. Names such as Yam, Pak, Kim, Kong, and Fat are neither in the Wade-Giles Mandarin pattern nor in any other system of Mandarin transliteration. These spellings reflect local dialect, or non-Mandarin, sounds. Hai-k'ou and Hoi-how refer to the same location, as do Ch'u-chiang and Ku-kong.

In concurrent use with these dialect spellings are Mandarin phonetic equivalents written in both Wade-Giles and other systems. The use of more than one method results in a variety of spellings for the same character: chuang and chwang, kiao and chiao, chow and chou, szu and ssu, to list a few.

The problem is compounded by the lack of an international, universally used, romanization system. Place-names transliterated into the English phonetic pattern will differ from those transliterated into other Western languages. A map or gazetteer of China using place-names with French phonetics, for example, has to be transliterated again for English readers. Transliteration in and out of the Cyrillic presents yet another problem.

There is a tendency to ignore established diacritics in transliterated names, although the use of such marks is not optional. These are not "refinements," but essential elements for contrast in meaning. Use of only alphabet letters without the diacritics is meaningless.

The indifferent application of hyphens between transliterated words is unfortunate also. The proper use of hyphens facilitates recognition of the components of a place-name and thus recognition of the place-name as such.

These variables in Chinese place-name usage have permitted several unsatisfactory customs to develop, and many of the lists in current use suffer from one or more of the following defects.

Alphabetization is frequently inconsistent: "Chu Liu Ho" may precede "Chuan Sha." Apostrophization is random, although the difference between ching and ch'ing, for example, is crucial to mean-

ingful transliteration. There is also a great deal of variation in the alphabet priority of aspirated and unaspirated sounds.

Duplicated entries occur without cross-referencing, as "Fort Bayard," "Kuang-chou-wan," and "Chan-chiang," or "An-tung," and "Ta-tung-kou." Some entries are not names of places in China--Mongolian locations being the usual case in point. Some lists include names that are purely Western, as, for instance, "White Cloud," and it is not made clear whether entries like "Victoria" are to be considered separate from "Hongkong," or whether "Kowloon" is to be distinguished from "Greater Kowloon," as it appears in some indexes.

Entries are frequently out of date: "T'ao-an" has been renamed "Pai-chen," and "Tung-an" has been changed to "Mi-shan," and so forth; but the outdated names are still published, usually in the same lists as the new names, with no notation that one has replaced the other.

Clearly, a single, authoritative source--one that could be universally employed--is needed for Chinese place-name systemization. The Gazetteer of the Board on Geographic Names, prepared by the U.S. Department of the Interior, is by far the most reliable list in circulation. It contains relatively few imperfections and, if used, would lessen the current disorder in Chinese place-name transliteration. But the Gazetteer is only a starting point, and many of the problems outlined above will have to be resolved before a satisfactory gazetteer can be compiled.

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